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ABSTRACT
Lesbian and Gay Student Mobilization at Texas A&M University, 1976-1985. 
(May 2011)
Andrew D. Vaserfirer, B.S.; B.A.; B.A., Iowa State University
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Ashley Currier
                              Dr. Sarah Gatson
Drawing on newspaper, movement correspondence, and interview data, I
examine the tactical selection and (in)visibility of a lesbian and gay student group, Gay
Student Services (GSS), in a hostile university campus in Texas from the mid-1970s
through the 1980s. GSS was formed to create a safe space for sexual minorities at Texas
A&M University (TAMU) and asked university officials to recognize the group
officially after physical threats of violence became real. After long delays, when TAMU
administrators declined GSS’s request, GSS filed a lawsuit against TAMU with the goal
of achieving formal recognition. 
In the first chapter, I offer a brief history of GSS and introduce my thesis
structure. In the second chapter, I show how early access to legal aid bolstered GSS
members’ understanding of their rights and encouraged their use of legal tactics. A sense
of legal entitlement also encouraged GSS to pursue legal tactics in the face of
administrative antagonism. The hostile campus environment also motivated GSS to
utilize legal tactics instead of engaging in more traditional forms of contention, such as
protest, to pursue their goal of gaining official status on campus. 
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In the third chapter, I examine how GSS utilized visibility and invisibility to
effectively navigate the hostile university environment. By controlling their (in)visibility
GSS members were able to shield the organization from scrutiny and protect members’
safety. Over time, as the campus environment became relatively more tolerant, GSS took
more public action. As GSS made itself more visible, so was its support. Despite
growing support and the positive outlook of the court case, GSS members knew they had
to carefully construct the appearance of an “ideal” student organization. This led GSS
members to carefully regulate their public actions. Such regulation extended beyond
GSS receiving official recognition from the university to prevent further controversy
from surrounding the organization. Finally, I end my thesis with a reflective conclusion
of my experiences researching GSS.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
 In 1976, a group of lesbian and gay students formed Gay Student Services (GSS)
at Texas A&M University (TAMU) as a service organization for lesbians and gay men at
TAMU. GSS planned to offer a variety of services, including a hotline that offered
medical, psychological, and religious counseling, a roommate-matching service to help
members find safe living spaces, and educational talks to encourage safety in the lesbian
and gay community. Initially, GSS wanted minimal official interaction with the
university, but were forced to seek recognition when three members of TAMU's armed
forces training program, the Corps of Cadets, threatened GSS members who were
posting flyers on campus. Official recognition as a student organization would have
provided GSS members protection from harassment because GSS would have all the
necessary permissions to exist on campus. After delaying their response to the GSS
application for eight months, GSS members threatened to file a lawsuit against TAMU.
This prompted university officials to deny GSS's request on the basis that the group's
goals were antithetical to TAMU traditions (Pinello 2003, p. 59). 
GSS members decided they had no choice but to challenge university officials’
decision despite the university's climate of antigay hostility. Seeing no other option, GSS
members initiated a lawsuit that lasted from 1977 to 1985. The university did not make
the legal process easy for GSS. University officials stalled as much as much as possible, 
__________
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2just as they did with the initial request. Eventually in 1984, the 5th Circuit Appellate
Court reached a decision in favor of GSS. TAMU appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court, which declined to hear the case. The 5th Circuit’s decision stood and allowed
lesbian and gay students to organize on campus in 1985. This constituted an important
development in lesbian and student mobilization in the United States. 
My masters’ thesis research focuses on two elements related to the GSS: their
strategic choice to use legal tactics and their (in)visibility. First, how did TAMU’s
gender and sexual policies and history affect GSS’s mobilization? GSS members were
forced to take action against the university if they wanted TAMU to recognize GSS as a
student group. What about the university's environment encouraged them to utilize legal
tactics rather than more direct, visible forms of protest such as sit-ins or marches against
university administration? Were there factors beyond the university's environment that
affected their tactical choices? Second, given the campus’ hostility to GSS’s existence,
GSS members controlled the visibility of members and of the organization. Fearing
retribution from the administration, student body, and local community for filing a
lawsuit against TAMU, GSS sought to protect the members and organization from
scrutiny before, during, and after the lawsuit. GSS supporters also had to work carefully
to avoid negative public perceptions. 
To answer these questions I utilized several kinds of data, including archival
research, a qualitative analysis of approximately 600 newspaper articles and 173 internal
GSS documents, and fourteen qualitative interviews with GSS members and supporters.
To understand the campus's environment and the hostility directed towards lesbians and
gay men, I consulted Cushing Library’s GSS collection and local and campus newspaper
3coverage of the lawsuit, internal GSS correspondence, and court documents.
Additionally, past GSS members and advisors granted me access to their private archives
on the GSS. I used mixed qualitative methods to balance activists’ lack of recollection
about GSS’s actions and bias in news coverage or internal GSS correspondence. 
I organized my thesis as two separate, stand-alone articles with an introductory
section and brief conclusion. The first article, Chapter II, focuses on my first research
question, the question of tactical choice, while the second article, Chapter III, addresses
GSS members’ (in)visibility management. 
4CHAPTER II
TACTICAL CHOICE
In 1976, six lesbian and gay students formed the Gay Student Services (GSS) and
sought recognition for the group from Texas A&M University (TAMU). University
officials denied their request on the ground that the GSS’s goals were antithetical to
TAMU traditions (Pinello 2003, p. 59). Amid a climate of antigay hostility, GSS
members decided to challenge the university officials’ decision. GSS members initiated
a lawsuit, Gay Student Services v. Texas A&M University, that lasted from 1977 to 1985.
Eventually, the 5th Circuit Appellate Court reached a decision in favor of the GSS in
1984; TAMU appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court refused
to hear the case, thereby upholding the 5th Circuit’s decision that TAMU had to
recognize the lesbian and gay student group. This decision allowed lesbians and gay men
to organize campus advocacy groups across the United States. 
This article focuses on GSS's choice to use legal tactics over other forms of
contention in a campus context of antigay vitriol. In 1963, TAMU began its
metamorphosis from an all-male, all white, land grant military school into one that
admitted civilians and women. Feminist scholarship has demonstrated how militarized,
all-male environments propagate homophobia, which can function as the content and
product of militarized masculinities (Kimmel 2000). Editorials in The Battalion, the
TAMU student newspaper, and threats to the GSS telephone helpline suggested violence
as the best way to deal with the GSS. For example, antigay opponents stated that they
5would “beat the hell outa [sic] the GSSO and all of its kooky-queers”1 (Hickman 1982),
contributing to the homophobic atmosphere on campus. In fact, the campus
administration was so resistant to the idea of lesbians’ and gays’ existence that in the
early 1970s, the university president addressed the incoming class of students by saying,
“welcome to Texas A&M the school where there is no drugs, no sex, and no
homosexuals” (Whitley 1977c). Intent on preserving the school’s heritage, the
administration blocked efforts to change the school’s masculine and heterosexualized
“traditions.” The administration’s feelings about maintaining the school’s “traditions”
were so strong that in 1976 the university's administration denied GSS’ request for
student group status without reading the application (Gay Student Services v. Texas
A&M University 1979, p. 4). 
In situations involving institutional repression, social movement organizations
(SMO) may choose tactics that directly challenge an institution. Cast as disruptive, these
tactics include protesting or lobbying decision makers (McAdam [1982] 1999; Tarrow
1998). Scholars do not necessarily consider legal tactics to constitute direct or disruptive
challenges (Burstein 1991). In this article, I adopt a different stance. I recognize that
legal tactics may be disruptive in hostile contexts in which conventional modes of
collective action, such as street protest or petitioning officials to change policies, are
untenable. Drawing inspiration from Armstrong and Bernstein’s (2008) multi-
institutional politics (MIP) model, I argue that GSS’s choice to pursue legal tactics
challenged university officials’ authority. GSS members’ tactical choice required that
they establish ties with legal experts. While litigation lasted for several years, GSS
1 “Beat the hell outta,” often-abbreviated BTHO, is the TAMU student rallying cry most often used at
sporting events in an effort to intimidate the opponent.
6members initiated an educational campaign related to the case. My work herein advances
social movement theory by examining how sociopolitical contexts affect how activists
decide which tactics are viable. 
Understanding Tactical Selection
Social movement scholars recognize the importance of a SMO's tactics (Burstein
1991; McAdam [1982] 1999; Tarrow 1998), but SMO tactical selection is largely
undertheorized (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). Tactical selection is dependent on the
tactics available to a group in its tactical repertoire (Tarrow 1998). Tactical repertoires
are “the distinctive constellations of tactics and strategies developed over time and used
by protest groups to act collectively in order to make claims on individuals and groups”
(Taylor and Van Dyke 2004, p. 265). These repertoires are not limited to visible actions
such as marches or strikes, but can also encompass discourse and identity creation, such
as rights framing (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). Over time, SMOs try out other possible
tactics, such as when the Civil Rights movement experimented with sit-ins and jail-ins in
the early 1960s (McAdam [1982] 1999; Tarrow 1998). Changes to the tactical repertoire
are slow to occur because these changes result from interaction between the SMO and its
target (Tarrow 1998). Tactical repertoires can change through tactical diffusion, the
process through which SMOs exchange tactics (Meyer and Whittier 1994; Tarrow 1998;
Whittier 2004). Tactical diffusion commonly occurs between different SMOs. The Civil
Rights movement, in the 1960s, successfully utilized rights framing within the
courtroom. After seeing the success of this tactic, lesbian and gay activists also started to
utilize their own form of rights framing to mount legal campaigns (Bernstein 2002).
7Different strands of social movement theory approach tactical selection in
distinct ways. Political process and resource mobilization theorists focus on how SMOs
exploit political opportunities and material resources (McAdam [1982] 1999; Tarrow
1998). Both models are vested in an elite model of society wherein working-class
individuals slowly gain political power or resources until they are able to mobilize
effectively to create or halt change (McAdam [1982] 1999). Both approaches
conceptualize tactical selection as contingent on the opportunity of power and resources
(McCammon 2003; Tarrow 1998). SMO actors utilize tactical choices instrumentally,
choosing the tactic they think will be most successful (Meyer 2004). For instance in
1975, a U.S. nuclear equipment supplier hired a research firm to analyze attitudes on
nuclear power so it could more effectively focus its pro-nuclear power movement on
those likely to resist the proliferation of nuclear power (Zald and Useem 1987).
Additionally, political process and resource mobilization theories analyze SMOs that
target political institutions, not cultural SMOs (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). These
approaches do not regard cultural actions, such as public spectacles and consciousness-
raising, as part of a conventional tactical repertoire.
Using political process theory, McCammon (2003) found that the availability of
resources and diversity of views within an SMO encouraged shifts in tactics within the
U.S. women's suffrage movement. If SMOs have access to the necessary resources and
maintain an open, varied discourse on tactics, they are more likely to change their
tactics. As more culturally-centered theories have become more popular, understandings
of SMO tactical selection have shifted. Meyer (2004) found that organizational identity
determined what tactics peace movement organizations in Israel, Northern Ireland, and
8South Africa selected. Meyer's findings have direct implications for tactical selection
because “organizational identities…drive the goals that SMOs pursue, the mix of tactics
they emphasize, the degree to which they change their tactics over time, and…how
contentious they are willing to be” (2004, p. 183). Polletta (2005) offers another
culturally-centered model of tactical selection. SMO adherents attribute symbolism to a
particular tactic and associate that tactic with other social groups. These symbolic
associations can alter a SMO's understanding of tactical effectiveness or usefulness
because of its relationship with a group that the SMO perceived positively or negatively
(Polletta 2005).
Theories more sensitive to cultural SMOs are more likely to recognize that a
SMO's impetus for tactical selection is based on the group's ideology than on structural
factors such as political opportunity or resource availability (Armstrong and Bernstein
2008; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004; Meyer 2004). Rather than distinguishing neatly
between cultural and political SMOs, the MIP model focuses on how SMOs behave in
particular contexts (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). The MIP perspective understands
that power is diffusely dispersed throughout society, rather than centralized in one
structure. Therefore, a SMO's focus can reach beyond specific political institutions,
targeting cultural attitudes as well (Bernstein 2002). SMOs may also target multiple
institutions simultaneously, including cultural institutions and the law. Additionally, the
MIP approach allows researchers to study SMO strategy intimately, as activists shift
their focus over time, rather than requiring researchers to analyze only one specific
aspect of a SMO, such as resources, framing, or opportunity (Armstrong and Bernstein
2008). In this sense, the disruptive nature of contention is dependent on context because
9“disruption need not threaten public order” (Tarrow 1998, p. 96). This permits the
recognition of certain tactics, such as the law, as both culturally and politically
disruptive. For example, a SMO's actors may knowingly choose a tactic that will not be
maximally effective, but one that fits their political grievances and ideological
orientation. The MIP approach does not deemphasize how important resources and
political opportunity are for tactical selection; instead, it focuses on both the structural
and cultural factors that affect tactical selection (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Jasper
2004). 
Repression, especially state repression, can directly impact a SMO's tactical
selection (Meyer 2004). In an overtly repressive context, groups may be unlikely to
select certain tactics in order to avoid backlash, such as in apartheid South Africa when
most SMOs avoided public protest due to sanctions from whites in power (McAdam
1986; Meyer 2004). In addition to the threats of physical violence directed toward a
SMO's members and proponents, there is also potential for “soft repression” (Ferree
2005, p. 88). The state and social institutions may attempt to stifle organizing by
silencing, ridiculing, and stigmatizing activists (Ferree 2005, p. 97). In the U.S., from the
1940s to the 1980s, police used anti-sodomy laws to harass and stigmatize lesbians and
gay men as criminals (Bernstein 2002). An indirect, nonviolent form of repression,
“channeling,” “affect[s] the forms of protest available, the timing of protests, and/or
flows of resources to movements” (Earl 2003, p. 48). Drawn-out legal battles can
constitute subtle repression if authorities use them as tools of discouragement (Earl
2003; Pinello 2003). Additionally, officials can use legal repression to control SMOs. To
constrain Southern civil rights organizing in the 1960s, state officials used “frequent
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questionable arrests, high bail, court proceedings, lack of due process, and injunctions
without legal foundation” with greater success than violent tactics” (Barkan 1984, p.
562).
The Law and Social Movement Organizations
Social movement studies often emphasize non-legal means of mobilization
(McAdam [1982] 1999; Tarrow 1998), but legal mobilization has emerged as an
important subject for students of tactical repertoires (Almeida and Stearns 1998;
Burstein 1991). Scholars tend to approach legal mobilization from two primary
theoretical vantage points. First, the political process and resource mobilization
approaches regard legal activism as requiring sufficient expertise and financial support
to create and sustain a legal campaign (Andersen 2006; McAdam [1982] 1999; Tarrow
1998). These traditions tend to subordinate the choice to use legal tactics to larger
processes of opportunity or resource availability (Burstein 1991; McAdam [1982] 1999).
Second, theories of legal consciousness assert that activists decide to use legal tactics if
they possess an adequate understanding of their legal entitlements or rights (Marshall
and Barclay 2003; Merry 1990). Legal consciousness theorists have focused on “how
and why conflict reaches the judicial system” (Marshall and Barclay 2003, p. 619). More
recently, legal consciousness theorists have started to explore how legal understandings
influence “goals, options and choices” (Marshall and Barclay 2003, p. 621). Although
both approaches provide insight into SMO tactical selection, neither is sufficiently able
explain to explain why activists choose or decline to use legal tactics. 
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Legal mobilization research also tends to subsume legal tactics within a larger
strategy, making it unclear how legal action unfolds within a SMO. This is particularly
evident when scholars consider the significance of judicial decisions. Some scholars
acknowledge the importance of a specific legal decision’s influence on a SMO, but they
typically lump legal tactics or outcomes with other outcomes, rather than analyzing legal
tactics or outcomes separately (e.g., Tarrow 1998; McAdam [1982] 1999). McAdam
([1982] 1999) assumes that past SMO success with protest tactics spurred activists to
pursue legal tactics, due to increasing political capital, but he does not thoroughly
analyze SMO participation and effects on these cases. This tendency results in scholars’
myopia with respect to how SMO conceptualize, use, and rank legal tactics. Paul
Burstein (1991) suggests that this uneven understanding of legal tactics in social
movement studies is related to the “inside/outside” dichotomy. As scholars focus on
groups that use “particular tactics,” such as direct-action tactics, lobbying, or litigation,
“those studying social movements virtually force themselves to abandon the field of
inquiry when the groups they are interested in begin to have influence” (Burstein 1991,
p. 1203). According to Burstein (1991, p. 1203), the “insider/outsider” dichotomy
persists because often social movement researchers focus on SMO actions that do not
utilize “proper channels,” such as the judicial system or lobbying. Thus, once an SMO
reaches “insider” status and obtains institutional power, scholars become less able to
account for why the organization chose certain tactics. In other words, scholars have a
tendency to examine the tactics of the powerless and ignore the tactics of the powerful,
such as legal tactics. In this sense, the insider/outsider dichotomy is collapsing. Certain
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SMOs’ use of institutionalized means of collective action erases the idea of the outsider
status (Werum and Winders 2001).
LGBT Organizing around the Law in the United States: 1950s-1980s
Many U.S. states, Texas included, had laws prohibiting same-sex sex until 2003
when the Supreme Court ruled sodomy laws unconstitutional. These laws defined same-
sex sexuality as criminal, reducing it to a single sex act—anal sex between men (Cain
2000; Clendinen and Nagourney 1999). As long as same-sex sexuality remained
criminalized in anti-sodomy statutes, lesbian and gay activists were unable to make
significant legal gains and to convince Americans, lawmakers, and social institutions
that they were normal, law-abiding citizens (Cain 2000). This status was especially
detrimental to early lesbian and gay organizing because many lesbians and gays believed
the pathologizing rhetoric that there was something wrong with them.
Lesbian and gay organizing in the 1950s primarily focused on self-help and
assimilation rather than political challenge (Armstrong 2002; Bernstein 2002). Initially,
lesbian and gay organizing was a risky endeavor, often undertaken in relative secrecy by
homophile organizations. Homophile activism concentrated on social and cultural
integration through mainstream political channels because discriminatory state policy
targeted lesbians and gay men. Since activists feared negative sanctions from the state,
homophile activists sometimes shied away from public action (Cain 1993; Jagose 1996).
Lesbians and gay men also faced negative consequences in the workplace and were
under the constant threat of losing their jobs due to their sexuality (Bernstein 2002). 
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In addition to using assimilation tactics, lesbian and gay activists “tried to
persuade psychological and religious authorities (and themselves) that homosexuality
[was] neither a sickness nor a sin” (Bernstein 2002, p. 541). Because the American
Psychological Association categorized homosexuality as a disorder in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders until 1973, medical professionals viewed it
as curable (Cain 2000). The pathologization of homosexuality created a problematic
legal situation for sexual minorities as the law regarded their sexuality as a curable
disease, making them second-class citizens. From the 1940s through the early 1960s,
homophile activists used a discourse of normalization to emphasize their similarities to
heterosexuals, trying to minimize negative state and cultural sanctions (Bernstein 2002).
Eventually, some started to identify themselves publicly as gay, lesbian, or homosexual,
but potential negative sanctions made publicly disclosing one’s sexual-minority identity
a dangerous decision (Jagose 1996).
By the mid 1960s, the expanding civil rights movement encouraged more lesbian
and gay men to organize (Armstrong 2002; Bernstein 2002). As homophile
organizations grew in membership, they began making demands on the state using
political and legal tactics; they lobbied legislators for equal rights when possible and
sued the state for the right to assemble openly (Bernstein 2002, 2003). These demands
enhanced the homophile movement’s visibility, spurring the creation of religious
countermovements that fought for increased sanctions against lesbian and gay persons
(Fetner 2008; Mucciaroni 2008). Emulating budding civil rights movements, homophile
activists used minority rights discourse to frame the legal tactics they used to obtain
equal rights and protection for sexual minorities (Armstrong 2002).
14
In the late 1960s, the formation of gay liberation groups fractured lesbian and
gay organizing. Gay liberationist groups outpaced homophile movements in terms of
growth (Armstrong 2002). Vested in challenging cultural norms, gay liberationists
preferred more visible tactics, such as public protests and marches, and moved away
from legal tactics, while homophile organizations favored working within mainstream
political channels (Bernstein 2002). For instance, gay liberation activists disrupted
psychiatric conventions to protest the classification of homosexuality as a mental illness
(Jagose 1996). For many gay liberationists, challenging cultural norms meant moving
away from an essentialized or fixed sexuality toward a more fluid understanding of
sexuality and gender (Bernstein 2002; Valocchi 1999). This led liberationists to try to
ally themselves with women’s and Black Power movements of the time, only to find that
some of these groups refused to work with gay liberationists (Bernstein 2002; Clendinen
and Nagourney 1999). 
With the decline of the gay liberation movement in the early 1970s, single-issue
gay lesbian and gay SMO began to form (Armstrong 2002; Bernstein 2002). These
organizations deployed collective action frames, such as “fairness” and “equal rights,” to
further their goals (Bernstein 2002; Pedriana 2009). Since these organizations focused
on single issues, such as repealing anti-sodomy laws, they lost potential allies who
worked on more broadly framed civil rights causes (Bernstein 2002). Additionally,
single-issue groups were less willing to compromise on their goals and tactics, leading to
further splintering within SMOs (Bernstein 2002). In 1973, Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund emerged as the first organization dedicated to gay rights litigation. The
organization had a troubled beginning. Lambda operated solely on a volunteer basis due
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to a lack of funding. Lambda’s members and leaders maintained a low profile for fear of
negative sanctions and had trouble convincing lawyers to associate with a pro-gay
organization because being “out” as a lesbian or gay man came with the risk of being
disbarred (Andersen 2006). 
In the 1980s, as lesbian and gay organizing became more organized and well-
funded national organizations formed, activists met strong resistance from the religious,
antigay countermovement (Fetner 2008). Lesbian and gay activists shifted their focus
from lobbying legislators to litigation because legislators had become less receptive to
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) needs than they had been in the past
(Kane 2003). Lesbian and gay activists targeted judges, who often did not have to worry
about reelection, because negative public opinion was less likely to influence judges and
more likely to sway legislators (Clendinen and Nagourney 1999; Mucciaroni 2008).
Organizations that pursued gay rights litigation, such as Lambda, led the campaign to
repeal sodomy laws at the state and federal levels more aggressively than ever before by
actively seeking cases to take to court (Andersen 2006; Pedriana 2009). The LGBT
movement’s legal success did not only depend on their mobilization; lawmakers in states
such as Illinois repealed sodomy laws based on recommendations from the American
Law Institute (Mucciaroni 2008).
LGBT Student Mobilization: The Case of GSS   
Although there is much research documenting shifts in LGBT organizing in the
U.S., there are few studies on lesbian and gay student organizing. Some studies include
information on LGBT student organizing, pointing out that student-led SMOs across the
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country followed trends that developed in the larger LGBT movement (Cain 2000).
Lesbian and gay student groups in more liberal areas, such as New England and the
West Coast, achieved university recognition with minimal contention, just as lawmakers
in some states voluntarily repealed anti-sodomy laws, making decriminalization
campaigns unnecessary (Cain 2000; Kane 2003). In contrast, universities in politically
conservative areas refused to let lesbian and gay student organizations operate on
campus, forcing students to take legal action (Bernstein 2002; Cain 2000). Taking legal
action was difficult for some student groups because they rarely had access to the legal
expertise or financial funding required to mount a legal campaign successfully
(Andersen 2006). Despite local antigay opposition, lesbian and gay student groups in
conservative areas obtained favorable outcomes when they sued universities for
recognition. For instance, in 1972, in the district-level First Amendment court case
Wood v. Davison, a lesbian and gay student group successfully sued to prevent the
University of Georgia's from canceling a planned event (Cain 2000). Some judges also
did not assume that a lesbian and gay SMO would necessarily promote same-sex sex,
even though anti-sodomy laws remained in effect, and ruled in favor of lesbian and gay
student organizations, as was the case in Wood v. Davison (Cain 2000). 
Despite the legal decisions that forced universities to recognize and offer some
amenities to lesbian and gay student organizations in the mid-1970s and 1980s, there
were still disparities in how universities treated “out” gays and lesbian students, staff,
and faculty. In many states, especially Southern ones, it was legal to discriminate against
a person based on her/his sexuality (Bernstein 2002; Cain 2000). For instance, in Texas,
anti-sodomy laws were still on the books, and enforced (ACLU n.d.). This political and
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cultural landscape made it hard and potentially dangerous for individuals to be “out”
because of the possibility for unemployment, harassment, or physical harm (Kane 2003).
The Formation of Gay Student Services 
Several white lesbian and gay Texas A&M University students formed GSS in
1976 to provide a support group for lesbian and gay students on campus. Of specific
importance to the GSS was campus culture and the Bryan/College Station community. It
was difficult for lesbians and gay men to live in College Station because of the largely
repressive environment exemplified by intolerance and misunderstanding. Groups like
the Corps of Cadets, an armed forces training program with relatively large enrollment,
were especially opposed to GSS and defended TAMU’s heteronormative traditions by
threatening and harassing GSS members on campus. TAMU also has a history of tense
race relations. Once African American students were allowed on campus in 1963, they
repeatedly had to demand that university administrators hire more African American
professors, enroll more African American students and offer Black history courses;
many African American students viewed the university as a “racist institution” (Martin
2001). Additionally, some university traditions2 were codified prior to the inclusion of
people of color and women at TAMU and excluded these groups from participating fully
in campus life (Nissimov 2002). 
Just as African American students were outcasts in the student population at
TAMU, so were lesbian and gay students. TAMU offered no formal protection to sexual
2 At TAMU, traditions are extremely important to student body cohesion. This manifests in multiple
elaborate ceremonies during sports events and throughout the school year. Incoming students also
attend including an orientation called “fish camp” that familiarizes them with the university's
traditions. See http://aggietraditions.tamu.edu/ for more information on TAMU traditions and their
importance.
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minorities, making it risky for lesbians and gay men to be “out” on campus. Repressive
environments like TAMU campus life in the late 1970s and early 1980s affect how
activists perceive the tactics available to them. More traditional forms of contention like
protest require a large participant base for success (McAdam [1982] 1999). High-risk
activism, such as engaging in property destruction, can attenuate a SMO's ability to
mobilize and recruit individuals (McAdam 1986; Tarrow 1998). These factors limit how
a group with little to no previous activism experience, like the GSS, navigates the
sociopolitical environment. 
GSS members carefully planned their actions and strategies. They applied for
university recognition when three Corps of Cadets members harassed and threatened
them when they posted flyers on campus advertising their organization. GSS members
decided it was prudent to apply for official recognition to ensure they would have
protection if similar harassment occurred in the future. Eventually, due to the campus
homophobia and officials’ refusal to respond to their application for recognition, legal
tactics gained intelligibility for GSS members as a viable tactic (Cain 2000; McAdam
[1982] 1999).
Data and Methods
I used multiple qualitative methods to understand why GSS members chose to
pursue legal tactics. First, I engaged in archival research to understand the historical and
social context of GSS mobilization at TAMU. I consulted Cushing Library’s private
archives at TAMU and collected GSS newsletters and documents and articles from The
Battalion, the TAMU student newspaper, related to the GSS, the GSS vs. TAMU lawsuit,
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and gender and sexual politics on campus. Several past GSS members and faculty
advisors shared their personal archives about GSS mobilization, which consisted of
allies’ correspondence, original court documents, audio recordings of a GSS member
interviewing two other members, a local radio show about the GSS’s demand for
recognition, a series of threats left on the GSS telephone hotline, and video recordings of
news coverage of GSS mobilization. In total, I gathered approximately 600 newspaper
articles and editorials from The Battalion, The Houston Chronicle, and Alternative News,
the local lesbian and gay student newspaper, and 173 GSS documents.
Social movement scholars acknowledge that newspaper data have limitations. In
particular, newspaper data suffer from both selection and description bias. Selection bias
refers to uneven news coverage of a SMO's actions as journalists and editors decide
which events to cover (Earl et al. 2004; Ortiz et al. 2005). Description bias refers to
imprecision in reporting about a protest event or an SMO (Earl et al. 2004; Ortiz et al.
2005). I also use opinion letters from the newspapers as data. This data has its own
issues as their authors are not always representative of the general population and editors
can alter the letter received so that it does not represent the original (Hull 2001).
Geography also constrains newspaper reporting, which affects the subjects on which
they report; this explains why I utilize local newspapers instead of national newspapers,
which did not cover GSS’s mobilization (Strawn 2008). Analysis of GSS documents and
interviews with GSS members counteracted newspaper data’s limitations.
Second, I interviewed GSS members and supporters. Recruiting GSS members
for interviews was difficult since more than twenty-five years had passed since the GSS
lawsuit. To locate potential interviewees, I first contacted TAMU faculty and staff for
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assistance in locating GSS members. While looking through archival data, I also took
note of names that appeared in relation to the GSS case. With these names in hand, I
used Internet search engines like Google to look for original GSS members or those
related to the lawsuit. These methods put me in contact with GSS members willing to be
interviewed. Additionally, I used snowball sampling techniques, asking initial
interviewees for the contact information of other potential interviewees. Snowball
sampling was ideal for this study because GSS activists were few in number, and the
nature of their activism made them the target of constant threats of violence and
stigmatization, even resulting in the vandalism of their personal property.
I used archival research to formulate open-ended interview questions about how
GSS operated, made tactical choices, and interacted with the university and the media. I
interviewed fourteen people for this project whose ages ranged from 39 to 67. The
interviews include GSS members, former and current TAMU faculty, and lawyers who
worked on the case. Of the interviewees, eight identified as gay men, two as
heterosexual men, two as women, one as a lesbian woman, and one as queer. Recruiting
people of color for my study was difficult because GSS membership mirrored the
university community, which was – and is – overwhelmingly white. Since most GSS
members and supporters were white, most people in my interview sample are white. I do
not identify GSS members specifically by their race or ethnicity in quotations or in the
demographic description of interviewees because interviewees of color might be
identifiable to others, which would violate the anonymity I guaranteed them. I conducted
ten interviews in person at a location of the interviewee's choosing and the remaining
four over the phone.  I recorded all interviews with a digital voice recorder. Interviews
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lasted between fifteen minutes and an hour; this variance in interview length stemmed
from some interviewees’ difficulty in remembering events. Many interviewees had
trouble recalling the events accurately, if at all; in these instances, I used my archival
research to fill in the gaps in memory. I assigned pseudonyms to interviewees to protect
their identities. I transcribed the interviews and coded them based on themes that
emerged from my transcription of the interviews and analysis of archival documents.
Coding categories included visibility, GSS goals, GSS actions, external and internal
dynamics, and external ties/audiences.
GSS Decision to Use Legal Tactics
Those involved with the GSS lawsuit stated that GSS had no other option but to
use legal tactics and noted they did not seriously consider other alternatives. What
caused this perception to arise? I identified three themes from my archival and interview
data that explain why GSS members preferred legal tactics to other forms of contention.
First, GSS had immediate access to legal counsel before they filed the lawsuit or had
contact with university officials. Second, GSS members had a sense of legal entitlement
that encouraged them to pursue the legal battle because they knew the law was on their
side. Finally, GSS members knew their request for recognition would not be popular in a
hostile environment, making legal tactics the only possible course of action.
Early Access to Legal Aid
GSS members initially thought there would be some problems with their request
for university recognition as a student group. Through a member’s acquaintance, GSS
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members contacted a lawyer before contacting any university representative to ensure
the group’s safety. They knew the risks involved in seeking university recognition as a
student group, due to antigay laws and the social treatment of lesbians and gay men in
Texas (Private Archive Tape 3, 12-09-1984). Emily, a faculty member who was present
during the lawsuit, stated that “it [homophobia] was just a free floating thing in the
[campus] atmosphere...gay people were targeted all the time” (Interview, April 5, 2010).
The lawyer had experience with a similar case at University of Texas in Austin, but that
case was settled out of court. The lawyer counseled GSS members about the possible
negative outcomes that could result from seeking university recognition and
recommended ways members could protect themselves if the situation deteriorated. The
lawyer advised members never to attend a meeting with university officials alone and
always to document what happened during meetings, dating these notes and gaining
signatures from GSS members in attendance (Private Archive Tape 3, 12-09-1984).
When the case went to court, GSS lawyers used members’ notes from meetings with
university officials to prove inconsistencies in the university's story. 
Through their interaction with lawyers, GSS members discovered how civil
rights cases of the time were often financed. If the defendant—the university in the case
of the GSS—were found in the wrong, the plaintiff's attorney could petition the court to
have the defendant pay the plaintiff’s legal fees. The GSS lawyers took advantage of
civil rights funding law and took the case pro bono, so the GSS would bear minimal out-
of-pocket expenses when various expenses would arise; in some situations, the lawyers
worked to minimize activist groups’ fees, even covering them when necessary,
according to Jack, a lawyer involved with the case (Jack, Interview, April 24, 2010). The
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lawyer and the GSS advisor, who “was very active in the ACLU [American Civil
Liberties Union]” used their connections to help GSS members garner a financial
donation from the ACLU (Allen, Interview, March 28, 2010; Turner 1976).3 
Second, GSS members believed that their demand for recognition was legally
defensible. GSS members' strong sense of legal entitlement was based on a layperson's
understanding of the law. They understood the law intuitively as a “cultural schema that
people use to understand their everyday experiences,” but were not familiar with the
technical details of creating a legal case or navigating the legal system (Marshall 2005,
p. 88). Initial contact with legal counsel fortified this belief. Jack stated that GSS
members relied on legal authority because they did not feel competent in their own
understanding of the law (Interview, April 24, 2010; Marshall and Barclay 2003). Jack
also noted that “it was basically the First Amendment…and we knew we had an
excellent chance at prevailing” (Interview, April 24, 2010), despite a lack of direct
precedence of gay and lesbian student groups suing universities for recognition. Jack
stated that any lawyer, especially one who specialized in civil rights litigation, would
have made this known to the group. The knowledge GSS members gained from legal
professionals and a lawyer’s willingness to work almost free of charge bolstered
members’ dedication to pursuing legal tactics. 
Legal Entitlement
Campus hostility initially prompted GSS members to apply for university
recognition. Amy, one of GSS’s founders, recalled that GSS members “had gone out
3 I could not find the exact details of how the ACLU became involved with GSS.
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postering [to raise awareness of Gayline, telephone hotline for sexual minorities]. . . and
some Corps guys with their name tags taken off had held them [GSS members] at knife
point and go around and take the posters down” (Interview, April 22, 2010). GSS
members knew they needed official recognition to protect themselves from further
danger. They did not necessarily have a clear understanding of the law before contacting
legal counsel, but they knew that it was their right to be treated just like other student
groups. GSS members viewed their group as no different from any other service
organization on campus, designed to help those who needed it. They were within their
right to request official status because GSS members saw themselves as students, and it
was the university's job to protect them (Sanction or Lawsuit 1976). Amy stated, “We
just had to convince them [the university] of our moral position.” She further clarified,
“All we have to do is make it clear that this [the campus environment toward minorities]
is wrong…I was raised a non-bigot, and I looked around me and thought this is just not
sane, not reasonable, and it was more that conviction than anything else…and I knew the
law was behind me” (Interview, April 22, 2010). In fact, David, one of GSS's faculty
advisors said he “was very surprised when the university refused the GSS's request for
recognition” because he believed the law was clearly on GSS's side (Interview, July 10,
2010). This led GSS members to conceptualize the law as protecting and helping them
when the university would not (Merry 1990).
 Despite the university’s opposition, GSS continued with the campaign to obtain
recognition because it “was the right thing to do,” according to Lisa, a GSS member
(Interview, April 29, 2010). This sentiment not only helped hold the organization
together, but also encouraged GSS members to continue the battle with the university
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when they experienced hostility. Once GSS applied for recognition in April 1976, the
organization had to wait eight months, while the university kept their application for
recognition “under advisement,” an example of channeling tactics (Whitley 1977b).
Campus culture prevented university officials from openly criticizing and rejecting
GSS’s request. Behind closed doors, university officials told the group that they would
deny the GSS’s application even before members filed any paperwork (Amy, Interview,
April 22, 2010). John Koldus, the university official in charge of the application,
“announced [in court] that, without reading the GSS application, he [had] made up his
mind to deny campus recognition to GSS” (Gay Student Services v. Texas A&M
University 1979, pp. 3-4). This delay indicated how university officials treated groups
they did not like publicly. Rather than offering an official outright dismissal, TAMU
officials hoped the group would fade away. Emily stated
Well, the way things work around here, it is always very polite. You know,
people go and ask for things, and they ask for things and ask for things, and the
university smiles and says, “Oh, yes yes yes, we understand, blah blah blah.”
That's the way it goes, but then the university doesn't do anything (Interview,
April 5, 2010).
Emily also suggested that even if the GSS had chosen other tactics over legal tactics,
TAMU would have treated the GSS in what seemed like a polite manner, but then would
have completely ignored the group’s requests. Officials’ “polite,” but neglectful
treatment became fully evident in December 1976 when the university denied the GSS’s
application for group recognition immediately after GSS members threatened the
university with legal action after TAMU had failed to respond officially to their initial
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request for recognition (Sanction or Lawsuit 1976). GSS members’ dedication to legal
tactics did not waver. One member stated in an interview with a reporter from the
student newspaper that “unless something very unusual develops arises, they (the
administration) don't have a chance” (A&M Gays Organize 1976). GSS members were
certain their case would prevail in court where other methods seemed futile due to the
university’s previous treatment and actions.
Pursuing legal tactics created the conditions for GSS members to select other
tactics. GSS members believed university officials denied the group’s application
because they held common misconceptions about lesbians and gay men. Because of the
growing publicity surrounding the group, GSS members developed an educational
campaign focused on lesbian and gay rights. In early interviews with the student
newspaper, GSS members tried to educate others about alternative sexualities and
negative stereotypes (Whitley 1977b). When talking about GSS’s interaction with legal
counsel, Thomas, a GSS member during the time of the lawsuit, stated, “We were there
[on campus] educating. We didn't have much legal contact” (Interview, April 2, 2010).
Once lawyers took over, GSS members had little to do with the case. GSS used a variety
of opportunities to educate including “consciousness-raising events” (Amy, Interview,
April 22, 2010), visiting classes at the behest of professors, “advise in whatever
capacity” necessary for the “debate society...on the GSS [subject], should it be
recognized or not” (Adam, Interview, April 15, 2010), and sponsor public discussions.
Allen, another GSS faculty advisor, pointed out that before filing the lawsuit, GSS had
recruited members “primarily through word of mouth” within the local lesbian and gay
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community because “in College Station [the lesbian and gay community] was very
small…everyone kind of knew each other” (Interview, March 18, 2010). 
The educational campaign enabled GSS to recruit members more effectively.
After filing the lawsuit, the GSS received press coverage that allowed the group to
disseminate its message to a wider audience through “events...that would bring
awareness to the group” and advertised services like “Gayline…and the roommate
[finding] services” (Thomas, Interview April 2, 2010). These services helped create a
safe space for lesbians and gay men. The increased publicity from the legal battle also
encouraged The Texas Human Rights Foundation (THRF) to help GSS. THRF, a lesbian
and gay SMO, viewed the lawsuit as an educational tool that brought lesbian and gay
issues into mainstream media and discourse (News Conference 1983). THRF “provided
most of the money for the suit” (Allen, Interview, March 18, 2010). At a “held a press
conference,” THRF representatives asserted that through the “Gay Student Services legal
battle against TAMU” and “public education, discrimination as displayed by TAMU
against the gay students will become a thing of the past” (News Conference, pp. 1-2). 
Hostile Environment
The hostile environment also affected GSS's choice to pursue legal tactics. GSS
members faced antagonism in their interactions with the university’s administration,
many faculty, most students, and local residents in Bryan and College Station, the two
cities that comprised TAMU's local community. Additionally, the local courts and legal
system created obstacles for GSS. Each group's hostility manifested differently. At first,
the lawsuit was centered in Texas’s legal system, but through the appeal process, the
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case moved up through the District Court for the Southern District of Texas and into the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, eventually making its way to the Supreme Court
via a writ of certiorari,4 where the TAMU’s request was denied. 
Multiple interviewees mentioned that the university would have “crushed” the
GSS if they had tried to use alternative forms of contention to express dissatisfaction
with the university's denial (Amy, Interview, April 22, 2010; Emily, Interview, April 5,
2010; Steve, Interview, March 29, 2010). Public protest would have fomented organized
opposition to GSS. In the archival tapes, an interviewee pointed out that “A&M did not
like its student organizations to be affiliated in any way politically.... Unless, of course,
you were Republican, religious, or if you were the right politics, you could affiliate to
your heart’s content; if you were the wrong politics, hey no no, so they had rules about
political affiliation” (Private Archive Tape 3, 12-09-1984). Thus, if the GSS had used
non-institutionalized forms of contention, such as sit-ins, protests or marches, it would
have hurt the group’s cause. Because the GSS used legal tactics, the university could not
act as forcefully and push the GSS out of existence; the decision was no longer in
officials’ hands. 
Legal/Political Environment
The GSS's case attracted statewide media attention. Three days after GSS filed
their suit, Texas state lawmakers introduced Senate Bill 800, legislation that would have
prevented the formation of “homosexual clubs” at TAMU and other state-funded
colleges and universities in Texas (Parks 1977). The legislation was introduced by
4  A writ of certioriari is the appellate process through which the Supreme Court of the United States
selects the cases it wishes to hear.
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Representative Walter H. Mengden Jr. of Houston, whose assistant went on the record as
stating Mengden “doesn't like queers!” when asked why he sponsored the bill (Whitley
1977a). This legislation would have stalled the formal recognition of lesbian or gay
organizations on Texas university campuses. To gain recognition, organizations would
first have had to challenge this law in court, if it had been passed. The proposed bill
indicated that GSS’s enemies included not only TAMU administration, but also some
Texas state legislators. 
The state's judicial branch did not view lesbian and gay rights and activism
favorably, as evidenced by their rulings in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the 1981
case, Childers v. Dallas Police Department, Childers contested the Dallas Police
Department’s refusal to hire him because he was openly gay; the federal district court
stated “there [were]…legitimate doubts about a homosexual’s ability to gain the trust
and respect of the personnel with whom he works” (ACLU n.d.). According to multiple
interviewees, there was also significant public and political pressure on federal district
Judge Ross N. Sterling who presided over the GSS case in Houston because of a pro-
lesbian and gay rights decision he had issued stating that a gay man's First Amendment
rights were violated when his superiors attempted to change his work hours so that he
could not speak to the county commissioner about lesbian and gay rights (ACLU n.d.).
With the “pro-gay” decision in Van Ooteghem v. Gray under his belt, the judge ruled
against the GSS out of fear of retribution for being “pro-gay,” but wrote a weak defense
of the decision so it was easily overturned in a higher court, according to Amy. Jack
explained that GSS “had an uphill battle against him [Sterling]...we knew going...which
side he was going to come down on” because of his deep ties with TAMU because his
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grandfather was a founding member a special group, The Ross Volunteers, within the
Corps of Cadets, the oldest group on campus and the official honor guard of the
university (Interview, April 24, 2010).
Campus Environment
Antigay hostility also trickled down from the university's regents and
administration to the students who emulated university leaders' attitudes toward the GSS.
Students and some groups intimidated and harassed GSS members without fear of
reprisal. From their first meeting with the administration, GSS members realized they
were not wanted on campus. But they faced a double bind. They could not receive
protection from harassment and threats without obtaining recognition of GSS as a
student organization. This required GSS members to reveal publicly that they belonged
to the group as stated in existing university regulation, which would also certify they
were lesbian or gay. According to Amy, three GSS members had to identify themselves
publicly as GSS to file an application for official recognition of their organization; this
identification revealed that these students were lesbian and gay. According to one
archival tape with a GSS founder, the university administrator who formulated this
policy thought “he could scare us; he thought that our position was that we were so
ashamed of ourselves that we would crawl under a rock and that we would never dare go
for recognition” (Private Archive Tape 3, 12-09-1984).
GSS also faced the university’s stalling tactics in handling the group’s
application and lawsuit. TAMU tried to draw out the lawsuit by appealing court
decisions that were not in their favor. Many interviewees thought the administration
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intentionally dragged out the lawsuit in an effort to drive GSS into the ground. GSS
members were keenly aware of the university's goal and thought “it would be terrible to
win that [legal] battle, and nobody would be here to do it [continue the GSS's legacy]”
(Thomas, Interview, April 2, 2010). Adam, a former GSS president, said one of the
group's goals was to “survive” (Adam, Interview, April 15, 2010; Earl 2003). One
example of the university working to hinder GSS’s survival occurred when the Texas
Attorney General, who was in charge of representing the university, released a statement
saying there would be no appeal of the Fifth Circuit Court's August 1984 ruling in favor
of GSS. The State of Texas was no longer willing to fund a losing battle and withdrew
its financial support (Puckett 1984). The TAMU Board of Regents and alumni
association assembled the funds for an appeal to the Supreme Court after TAMU
indicated in an initial press release that the university would allow the decision to stand
uncontested, which mirrored the State's decision to let the verdict stand (Fluegel 1984).
Although formal communication between GSS and the university was cordial,
the campus environment did not accept those who disrupted the school’s
heteronormative traditions. GSS members often experienced intimidation, threats, and
harassment, which were implicitly endorsed by university officials. GSS members
endured “pushing, shoving, and being beaten up,” according to Steve, a GSS member
(Interview, March 29, 2010). The university condoned actions taken by students against
GSS members and supporters because there were no consequences for discriminating
against the lesbian and gay community. Both Thomas and Adam recalled the “group
called Maranatha [Christian Fellowship]” put out a “flyer [that] ...compared
homosexuals to depraved sexual acts and bestiality and other things like that” (Interview,
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April 2, 2010; Interview, April 15, 2010). Although GSS won recognition as a student
group, these problems continued because the university refused to add official protection
for LGBT students and faculty in the university's rules. Additionally, harassment
directed against GSS members and lesbian and gay individuals did not stop once the
group technically had university protection. GSS members were also confronted with
constant harassment and death threats well into the 1990s from Corps members who
called Gayline. In these messages, callers often yelled “faggot,” laughed, and issued
threats like “I'm going to kick all your little pussy whipping asses, you butt fuckers”;
without fear of reprisal, callers sometimes revealed their names, ranks, and room
numbers in their messages (Voicemail Tape 1990). In one case in 1991, a story in The
Battalion documented how a university building was vandalized with the statement
“KILL FAGS” in chalk on National Coming Out Day. The university never bothered to
clean it up; instead, more than 48 hours later, a private party cleaned up the statement
(Hobbs 1991).
Conclusion
SMOs have to make important choices about how they will mobilize and which
tactics they will use. These choices are dependent on the sociopolitical environment.
GSS members, current and past faculty members, and the group's lawyers maintained
that group members had no choice but to select legal tactics as their primary means of
contention. First, GSS members believed that their position was right, and their contact
with legal counsel encouraged this understanding. Second, the campus and state political
environment was so hostile that the group had no choice, but to remove any decision-
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making power from their possible control. These factors generated a situation in which
the GSS members saw no other option but to proceed with a lawsuit.
This case study suggests that several elements predispose SMO to adopting legal
tactics. First, while SMO adherents might strongly believe in their legal entitlement to
equal treatment, access to legal expertise is vital to a SMO's legal success. A SMO has to
find a lawyer willing to pursue their claim and procure the funding to pay legal counsel.
Small groups targeting large organizations can face limitations when using the court
system because of available resources. Large organizations typically have access to well-
trained legal counsel and to hire large legal teams, allowing for the implementation of
costly, time-intensive tactics to overwhelm the smaller organization. If an organization is
able to overcome these challenges, then the legal system can be a useful tool for
correcting local grievances SMO action cannot overturn by using “outsider” tactics.
Second, contact with legal counsel early in a SMO's formation can affect SMO
development by allowing activists to preview possible legal and institutional outcomes.
Legal counsel can show SMO adherents how their grievances are not just institutional or
cultural issues, but are also legal matters. Contact with legal counsel thus shapes how
activists view and select tactics and can influence whether activists choose to use legal
tactics.  
Third, when the environment is hostile to certain social groups or forms of
mobilization, SMOs may be unable to pursue “traditional” forms of activism. Then, legal
alternatives can become more attractive. Legal tactics allow a SMO to temporarily
remove their case from a negative environment and plead it in front of an impartial
arbitrator. Involving the legal system takes the decision out of the institution’s grasp and
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obligates the target institution to follow the court's orders. The ruling may not only affect
SMO outcomes, but it may also have cascading effects that shape the other SMOs’
tactical possibilities 
Social movement scholarship can benefit from focusing on the issue of why
groups choose to use legal tactics. What combinations of access to legal counsel and
funding allow SMOs to pursue legal tactics? Is belief in the legal system enough? How
hostile must an environment be before legal tactics become an only choice? Under what
circumstances do legal tactics become impracticable? It is clear, in the case of GSS, that
a hostile environment mixed with GSS members’ legal consciousness and external
funding allowed the SMO to pursue a lawsuit against the university. Culturally focused
theoretical frameworks, such as MIP, offer new insight into SMOs’ tactical selection. 
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CHAPTER III
(IN)VISIBILITY
In 1976, when students at Texas A&M University (TAMU) formed Gay Student
Services (GSS), the organization and its members anonymity for their personal safety
because the campus atmosphere was hostile towards lesbians and gay men. This
inhospitable environment prompted GSS leaders to discuss their organizational status
with TAMU administration; to qualify for campus protection, campus administrators
would have had to certify GSS as a TAMU student group. GSS members wanted to
maintain as much anonymity as possible and only requested partial status so they could
post flyers on campus with administrative approval and expect protection if necessary,
but would not use any other university resources. TAMU administrators were not
amenable to this request, stating partial status was not an option for any student
organization, and required GSS to apply for full recognition. In order to become an
official student group, three GSS members were required to reveal their identities as part
of the application process; such a revelation would have confirmed that these members
were lesbian or gay, public disclosure members did not want to risk in a homophobic
environment. GSS members viewed this requirement as an effort to bully the group.
Refusing to let the administration intimidate them, GSS members applied for recognition
as a student organization. The university’s administration stalled for approximately eight
months and finally denied GSS’ application when members threatened legal action. GSS
sued for their right to organize as a campus group, which brought publicity to their case
and a largely invisible sexual-minority population at TAMU.
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This chapter focuses on the controlled and uncontrolled aspects of GSS’s
visibility and invisibility during their conflict with the university. Because TAMU was
an overtly hostile environment towards lesbians and gay men, GSS required varying
levels of (in)visibility so the organization and its members could safely navigate their
time at the university. Early in GSS's existence while the organization was relatively
unknown on campus, a member of the Corps of Cadets, TAMU’s armed-forces training
program, threatened a group of GSS members at knifepoint, while they were posting
flyers on campus. This experience solidified the potential threat of hostility at the
university. After GSS filed the lawsuit, antigay opponents suggested violence in The
Battalion, the student newspaper, as a way to silence lesbian and gay student activists.
At one event The Battalion covered in 1977, antigay opponents hung a sign from a
dormitory window that read “AGGIES ARE NOT QUEERS. BEAT THE HELL OUT
OF THE G.S.S.O.!”5 (Reis 1977, emphasis in original). As GSS became more visible, by
filing a lawsuit spurring increased public hostility, how did GSS members carefully
control their (in)visibility so that members could safely navigate their lives as students at
TAMU while fighting for their rights as lesbians and gay men?
(In)Visibility in Social Movement Organizations
Visibility manifests as a “fluctuating quality that movement organizations
carefully cultivate over time,” allowing for the understanding of SMO visibility as
“dynamic, multi-directional, multiscalar and engaged with multiple audiences…
[shifting] with changes in the external sociopolitical environment and internal
5 “Beat the hell outta” is the TAMU student rallying cry often used at sporting events to intimidate the
opposing team.
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movement-organizational culture” (Currier n.d., p. 37). Social movement theorists have
long regarded social movement organization (SMO) visibility positively, while viewing
invisibility negatively (Currier n.d.). This understanding of visibility is rooted in the idea
that “authorities will not react to – and will often not even know about – protests that are
not reported in the media” (Koopmans 2004, p. 368). In other words, without visibility, a
social movement cannot realize activists’ goals because activists will not have the ability
to influence different actors and targets. As SMOs interact with different target
audiences, the SMO may become visible in different ways as necessary to protect
members or achieve its goals (Currier n.d., 2010; Stoecker 1995).
In contrast, scholarship views invisibility as a sign of unsuccessful or declining
SMO activity (Taylor 1989). Conceptualizing visibility and invisibility dichotomously
results in a loss of nuance regarding SMO activity, such as when an SMO actively seeks
a certain kind of invisibility (Currier n.d.). Despite social movement scholars’ common
understandings of invisibility, many SMOs try to balance their visibility and invisibility.
Early homophile activists, fearing negative sanctions from the state, avoided public
action (Cain 1993; Jagose 1996). Visibility and invisibility are not dichotomous; instead,
they exist on opposite sides of a continuum such that (in)visibility can manifest in
multiple levels specific as required by an SMO and the sociopolitical field within which
the SMO operates (Currier n.d.). How then do lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) SMOs utilize both visibility and invisibility strategically?
To understanding how SMOs control their (in)visibility in a particular
sociopolitical environment, I turn to the multi-institutional politics (MIP) model of social
movements (Armstrong and Bernstein’s 2008). The MIP approach conceptualizes SMOs
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as targeting multiple cultural and political institutions to achieve their goals. As
institutions differ, so does the ideal method of interacting with the institution. For
example, an SMO might maintain differing levels of visibility with the media than with
an antagonistic movement (Johnston 2005). An SMO involved in extra-legal activities
may take great care to avoid direct contact with the government, to avoid legal
repercussions, which has been the case with militias in the U.S.; however, some militias
seek out sympathetic media coverage to spread their varying, often anti-government,
messages (Johnston 2005). By recognizing that SMOs target multiple institutions using
diverse methods, the MIP approach allows for the realization that SMOs may also
require varying levels of visibility depending on the institution they target (Armstrong
and Bernstein 2008; Van Dyke, Soule and Taylor 2004).
Constituent (In)Visibility and Safety   
As SMOs accrue visibility, their constituents also usually become more visible.
At a time of increasing visibility in high-risk movements, individual members may
develop concerns about their increasing visibility and overall safety (Hanhardt 2008).
The interplay between movement visibility and constituent safety can result in an SMO
utilizing differing visibility strategies for its constituents relative to the larger movement.
SMOs respond to constituent concerns about safety by developing tactics to protect their
members, such as when a SMO uses strategies of normalization, the synchronization of
“personal, organizational, and movement identities to consolidate collective identities,”6
to “articulate the boundaries” of their organizing in an attempt to prevent public scrutiny
6 Stoecker (1995, p. 114) refers to the synchronization of the multiple identities as “identity
convergence.”
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of the SMO and by extension protecting the safety of its members (Currier 2010, p. 50).
For example, employing normalization tactics, in 1994, the International Lesbian and
Gay Association (ILGA) expelled the North American Man/Boy Love Association
(NAMBLA) because of public outrage, castigating the organization as pedophiles
(Currier 2010; Gamson 1997). By “emphasizing NAMBLA's social abnormality,” ILGA
was able to normalize itself within public discourse, which protected ILGA and its
members from growing public outrage (Currier 2010, p. 50).
Lesbian and gay SMOs in the United States actively created programs to protect
members as their visibility increased. In the mid-1970s, patrollers with the Butterfly
Brigade, a gay safe street patrol in California's Castro district that was an offshoot of a
larger gay liberation organization, recorded tag information from cars in the area whose
occupants yelled antigay epithets or were perceived as threats (Hanhardt 2008). Later,
members used car license plate numbers to look up the owners and send them a letter
about the recorded actions of the night to discourage further discrimination (Hanhardt
2008). Street patrols generated “publicity about [anti-gay] violence” so that lesbians and
gay men could claim “geographic spaces…as gay territories” or safe spaces, spaces in
which activists developed their collective identity and their organizational values
without fear of retribution from the public (Evans and Boyte 1992; Hanhardt 2008, p.
74). Lesbians and gay men also faced sanctions at work, such as being fired or disbarred
from professional organizations. This encouraged many activists to hide their affiliation
with homophile organizations while homophile organizations were hesitant to publicize
meetings because they wanted to avoid outing members (Bernstein 2002). When
homophile activists were fired from their jobs, homophile organizations utilized public
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tactics, such as lawsuits and picketing, to combat the discriminatory practices found
within the law (Bernstein 2002). Homophile organizations and their members balanced
the necessity for invisibility, to protect members, and visibility, to attract new members
and encourage public discourse, forced lesbians and gay men to carefully navigate their
environment.
LGBT Movement (In)Visibility in the United States: 1950s-1980s
Early lesbian and gay movement organizations utilized visibility and invisibility
strategically to both protect members and achieve their goals. In the 1940s, early
homophile SMOs remained invisible and avoided public action to avoid state sanction
for members individually, but also for the group as a whole (Cain 1993; Jagose 1996).
Homophile organizations’ invisibility also manifested in their organizational structures,
with groups loosely organized “cell groups that did not necessarily know one another”;
this provided another layer of protection for organizations and their members (Jagose
1996, p. 24). Rather than participating in political rallies, marches, or other forms of
public action, homophile organizations focused on “assimilation and quiescence”
(Bernstein 2002, p. 541). Homophile movements utilized assimilation strategies due to
sociopolitical hostility toward lesbians and gay men. Medical professionals and religious
authorities considered homosexuality a sickness and sin (D’Emilio 1983). Hostility
toward homosexuals as a group encouraged lawmakers to pass discriminatory legislation
against lesbians and gay men (Cain 2000). Anti-sodomy laws reduced same-sex
sexuality to an illegal act, and lawmakers and the police used sexual solicitation and
loitering laws in concert with anti-sodomy laws to prevent the political and social
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gatherings of lesbians and gay men (Bernstein 2002; Cain 2000; Clendinen and
Nagourney 1999). Lawmakers intended such laws to limit lesbians and gay men from
interacting with one another; homophile activists feared additional retribution from the
police and lawmakers (Bernstein 2002). Homophile activists responded to social and
political hostility by creating safe spaces; some formed support groups and focused on
individual self-help and education, rather than on visible political activism (Bernstein
2002; Evans and Boyte 1992; White 2009). 
Over time, as the sociopolitical environment became less hostile because of
growing responsiveness in the polity, activists started to publicly identify themselves as
lesbians and gay men. In their strategic deployment of identity, lesbian and gay activists
recruited members and publicized their goals (Armstrong 2002; Bernstein 1997, 2002,
2005; Jagose 1996). Lesbian and gay activists borrowed tactics from and modified
ideologies used by the civil rights movement (Bernstein 2002). Homophile activists also
targeted legislators through lobbying and used legal tactics so they could assemble freely
and openly in a safe manner (Bernstein 2002, 2003). As homophile organizations grew
and became more visible, they spurred the creation of antigay countermovements (Fetner
2008; Mucciaroni 2008).
Unhappy with focusing on assimilation and normalization, gay liberationists
formed separate organizations in the late 1960s (Armstrong 2002). Gay liberation
organizations focused on breaking society's gender and sexuality norms by using visible
tactics, such as sit-ins and marches; they hoped these tactics would result in a more fluid
understanding of sexuality and gender by making these issues visible to the public,
creating a new discourse about gender and sexuality (Bernstein 2002; Valocchi 1999).
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Gay liberation activists also tried to ally themselves with women's and Black Power
SMOs, but many groups refused to ally themselves with the gay liberation SMOs
because of the potential for negative public reaction. This precipitated the demise of the
gay liberation movement in the 1970s (Bernstein 2002; Clendinen and Nagourney 1999).
Following this decline, single-issue lesbian and gay SMOs emerged and concentrated on
publicly portraying a more acceptable “fixed identity” (Bernstein 2002, p. 552). Single-
issue SMOs typically focused on abstract principles found within the larger civil rights
movement, such as equality, instead of on identities themselves (Bernstein 2002). 
The increasing publicity around the lesbian and gay movement resulted in the
formalization of an antigay countermovement. In the late 1970s, to combat the antigay
countermovement, lesbian and gay SMOs began to work together on a national scale on
highly visible actions, such as the March on Washington (Bernstein 2002; Fetner 2008;
Ghaziani 2008). Such visibility strategies helped certify lesbians and gay men as a
growing political constituency, evidenced by politicians courting sexual minorities for
their votes (Hertzog 1996). As politicians realized the importance of the LGBT vote,
LGBT lobbying groups focused on national politics, which led to specialization, or
“niche activism,” of LGBT rights groups (Bernstein 2002; Clendinen and Nagourney
1999; Levitsky 2007). 
Data and Methods
I used several qualitative methods to understand how the GSS used visibility and
invisibility as strategies. Initially, I utilized archival research to understand the
sociopolitical context of GSS's actions at TAMU. I collected GSS documents and
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correspondence and articles from the TAMU student newspaper, The Battalion, from
Cushing Library at TAMU. Additionally, several GSS members and faculty advisors
allowed me to consult their personal GSS archives. These personal archives consisted of
correspondence with allies, court documents, video recordings of news coverage on
GSS, and audio recordings of an interview with a GSS member, GSS members’
participation in local talk radio shows, and threats left on the GSS telephone hotline. I
gathered 173 GSS documents and approximately 600 newspaper articles and editorials
from local and regional papers, such as The Battalion, The Houston Chronicle, and
Alternative News, the local lesbian and gay student newspaper.
Using newspaper data has known limitations, such as description bias, or the
inexactness in reporting on a SMO or protest event, and selection bias, the uneven news
coverage of a SMO's actions (Earl et al. 2004; Ortiz et al. 2005). Opinion letters in
newspapers also present their own limitations because their authors are not always
representative of the general population, and editors can alter the letters received so that
they do not represent the original (Hull 2001). Because geography constrains the stories
on which newspapers report, I utilize local and regional newspapers, rather than national
ones (Strawn 2008). 
After receiving Institutional Review Board approval, I interviewed GSS
members and supporters and analyzed GSS documents to counteract the limitations
associated with newspaper data. Locating potential interviewees was difficult because
twenty-five years have passed since the GSS lawsuit. First, I contacted TAMU faculty
and staff present during the legal battle for assistance locating GSS members. I also took
note of names that appeared in archival materials and used Internet search engines, such
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as Google, and the TAMU Association of Former Students to find original GSS
members. I used snowball sampling techniques with the individuals I interviewed to find
the contact information of other potential interviewees (Brown 2005). 
My archival research was instrumental in developing open-ended interview
questions that focused on how GSS operated, made tactical choices, and interacted with
TAMU, the media, and the student body. I interviewed fourteen people, including GSS
members, former and current TAMU faculty, and GSS lawyers. Interviewees’ ages
ranged from 39 to 67, and eight identified as gay men, two as heterosexual men, two as
women, one as a lesbian woman, and one as queer. GSS membership mirrored the
university's demographics; most TAMU students and GSS members and supporters were
white, making it difficult to recruit people of color for interviews. Thus, most
interviewees identified as white or Caucasian. I do not identify interviewees by their race
or ethnicity because it could violate their confidentiality. I interviewed ten people in
person at a location of the interviewee's choosing and conducted the remaining four over
the phone, due geographic constraints preventing face-to-face interviews. Interviewees
took place between March and August 2010. I recorded all interviews, which lasted
between fifteen minutes and an hour, with a digital voice recorder. Many interviewees
could not recall the events accurately, if at all, resulting in the variance in interview
length; in these instances, I used archival data to fill in interviewees’ memory gaps. I
assigned pseudonyms to all interviewees to protect their identities. After transcribing
interviews, I coded them based on themes that emerged from my archival data and
interview analysis. These categories included (in)visibility, GSS goals, GSS actions,
external and internal dynamics, and external ties/audiences.
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(In)Visibility and GSS
Early in its existence, GSS members focused on keeping the group invisible,
primarily due to a fear of hostility. Despite this concern, GSS members and supporters
gradually made themselves and the group more visible. How did (in)visibility affect
GSS? Three themes arose from my archival and interview data that help explain the
effects of (in)visibility on the GSS. First, there is a general trend toward visibility in the
GSS's actions, but even with growing visibility, GSS carefully tried to control its
visibility. Second, as GSS became more visible and vocal on campus, GSS sympathizers
became more willing to show their support publicly. Third, GSS members knew TAMU
administration and students were watching them closely. GSS members purposely
altered their behavior to guard against the university's gaze. 
Growing Visibility with Controlled Invisibility
Prior to the launch of GSS, discussion of lesbian and gay issues at TAMU was
nonexistent, beyond denial of the existence of same-sex sexuality on campus (Whitley
1977c). Emily, a faculty member present during the lawsuit, said university officials
denied rumors about “what was going on in the [Corps of Cadets] showers and stuff like
[male-male sex]” (Interview, April 5, 2010). The university got “a very bad reputation,
[so much so that] straight guys didn't want to come.” According to Emily, these rumors
contributed to the decision for TAMU to admit women as students in 1963; officials
hoped more heterosexual men would come to TAMU and join the Corps of Cadets
(Interview, April 5, 2010). Instead of admitting some men students had sex with one
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another and dealing with the problem directly, the administration chose to hide the
problem and make an unpopular decision to admit women as students7 (Kavanagh 2001).
When GSS was first established in 1976, members advertised the group
discreetly. They knew students and school officials would not respond well to a group or
individuals openly defying heteronormativity, the set of cultural practices that maintain
the assumption that there are only two genders and sexes and that only opposite sexual
attraction be sexes acceptable, on campus (Schilt and Westbrook 2009). Aware of the
potential for danger, members quietly posted inconspicuous flyers around campus.
Flyers only displayed a lambda8 and stated GSS was a support group because GSS
members “assumed [the right] people would know what it meant” (Amy, Interview,
April 22, 2010). Instead, many people thought GSS was a religious group (Amy,
Interview, April 22, 2010). Eventually, GSS members realized such obfuscation
protected themselves and GSS from scrutiny and hostility, but did not allow the group to
create a community or fulfill GSS’s service goals of helping lesbians and gay men on
campus because they could not reach out to new members effectively. In this sense,
invisibility protected GSS members, but hampered their abilities to accomplish their
goals. GSS members knew a change was needed. 
Members shifted their strategy and tried to balance their anonymity with outreach
to new potential members, resulting in an increase in GSS’s visibility. Members
launched a newsletter for the lesbian and gay community called Alternative News and
7 The decision to admit women was unpopular because it broke with one of TAMU's oldest traditions,
being an all-male institution.
8 “The symbol [lambda] was originally chosen by the Gay Activists Alliance [GAA] of New York in
1970…Because of its official adoption by the GAA, which sponsored public events for the gay
community, the lambda soon became a quick way for the members of the gay community to identify
each other. The reasoning was that the lambda would easily be mistaken for a college fraternity symbol
and ignored by the majority of the population” (Riffenburg 2004).
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Views. It was available to anyone who subscribed, but GSS members maintained
pseudonyms for columnists and editors while keeping the subscriber list private. In the
1960s, One Magazine, a homophile publication, utilized a similar strategy encouraging
columnists to employ pseudonyms for their own protection (White 2009). GSS members
took similar care to maintain anonymity when they consented to newspaper interviews;
they often asked journalists to interview them anonymously or to publish only part of
their name. Initially, the three GSS members who filed the lawsuit against TAMU
included only their first initial and last name because of the public nature of lawsuit
documentation. GSS members also held group meetings in secrecy. Rather than publicly
posting meeting times and locations, GSS members posted the Gayline9 phone number
on flyers. “If you wanted to know [the time and location of a meeting], you would have
to call the Gayline to find out” (Interview, Thomas, April 2, 2010). While there was no
official vetting process for giving out meeting locations and times, members felt this
extra step helped to prevent problems at meetings (Interview, Thomas, April 2, 2010). 
These preventative measures allowed GSS members to feel safer on campus
because they remained mostly anonymous, while the GSS as a whole became more
visible. Emily noted that homophobic hostility “was just a free-floating thing in the
[campus and local] atmosphere” (Interview, April 5, 2010). A generic lesbian and gay
community was the abstract focus in editorials published in The Battalion, the university
newspaper, and The Eagle, the local Bryan/College Station newspaper. While GSS
worked anonymously, the free-floating hostility had no centralized, direct target,
enabling GSS members to work without as much fear of retribution. 
9 Gayline was GSS’s phone hotline. Gayline volunteers referred callers to medical, religious, and
counseling professionals and disseminated information about GSS.
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As time passed, the names of the three GSS members who filed the lawsuit
against the university were released as part of the public record. Soon thereafter, some
became the targets of direct hostility. According to Allen, a faculty advisor to GSS, one
member whose name was released on the lawsuit was “kicked out of [the member's
rented] home.” A GSS supporter responded to this pressure by offering friendly housing
so the member could “sigh a big sigh of relief…because [the member] knew [the
member] wouldn't get kicked out again” (Interview, March 19, 2010).10 Other visible
GSS members received harassing phone calls at home and also lived in fear of violence
on campus or at their homes. In one case of antigay hostility targeting an individual, a
GSS member’s parents “set fire to her room, in their own home,” upon finding out she
was a lesbian (Interview, Amy, April 22, 2010). GSS worked to protect its members by
acting as a community or “family” to insulate members from these varying forms of
external hostility (Interview, Amy, April 22, 2010). 
As the lawsuit progressed, more members made themselves and GSS visible in
an effort to politicize their cause, while attempting to change the general perceptions
about lesbians and gay men on campus and in the local community. Newer, younger
members were “far braver than the rest of us [the founders]” because they were more
political, and they were far more willing to be visible (Interview, Amy, April 22, 2010).
The entry of new members energized GSS and altered the group’s approach to visibility
strategies. Borrowing tactics from feminist organizing, members held multiple
“consciousness-raising” events on campus meant to encourage the local and university
community to think about lesbian and gay rights (Interview, Allen, March 18, 2010;
10 The GSS member's gender was removed to preserve anonymity.
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Interview, Amy, April 22, 2010; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). Blue jeans day was one
such event when GSS members encouraged lesbians, gay men and their supporters to
wear blue jeans as a sign of unity. According to one GSS member interviewed by The
Battalion, GSS chose blue jeans day as a consciousness-raising event because the
National Gay Task Force sponsored and encouraged lesbian and gay student groups to
adopt it. The event acted to “help pull the gay groups together.” There was also the
“possibility that straights might wear blue jeans and thus be harassed…help[ing] them
see the world from a gay's point of view” (Gay Supporters 1978). Blue jeans day “got a
lot of non-gay students really upset” because other heterosexual students mistook them
as GSS supporters or members (Interview, Allen, March 18, 2010). The knee-jerk
reaction from students encouraged local clothing businesses that “loved” blue jeans days
and even let “us [GSS] put posters in their window and they would immediately sell out
of cords”  (Interview, Amy, April 22, 2010). Even though blue jeans day brought
publicity to GSS, it also provided members and supporters safety and protection from
being “outed.” The ubiquity of blue jeans meant that no one could be positive if the
person in blue jeans actually was a GSS supporter,  GSS member, or someone who
unwittingly wore jeans on the “wrong” day (Interview, Thomas, April 2, 2010). 
GSS members occasionally participated in political rally days, an open forum run
by students dedicated to discussing varying political viewpoints, but GSS carefully
navigated the terrain because of members’ fear of student hostility. In response to
members’ fears, GSS members carefully orchestrated their participation in these rallies.
For example, in 1983, anticipating there would be backlash to their presence, GSS
members asked an “out” transgender TAMU Corps of Cadets former student to come
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and have a separate table at the rally in an effort to deflect hostility away from GSS. The
alumna wore feminized aspects of the Corps of Cadets uniform and passed out a double-
sided flyer designed to “attack…remaining stereotypes” about the LGBT community; on
one side, the flyer depicted the “all-American” TAMU student while the other
represented her after she “became the person who had been locked-up inside” (Which
Former Student 1983).  This strategy allowed GSS to successfully navigate the political
rally day without “any negative reactions” toward GSS members. The transgender
former student’s table attracted “a lot of boos and hisses as well as some laughter”
(Interview, Jimmy, May 3, 2010). The transgender former student's flamboyant mockery
of TAMU traditions resulted in the deflection of attention from individual GSS members
sitting at their table during the rally (Interview, Jimmy, May 3, 2010).
GSS members and the local lesbian and gay community also tried to police the
visibility of other members. Such policing occurred both during the lawsuit and after
GSS won the lawsuit and received official recognition in 1985, at which point GSS
publicly held meetings on campus. One Alternative article chastised two men for kissing
at a GSS picnic; fearing “ugly action” from other park goers, the article encouraged
members to be “discreet” in their displays of affection (Notes from Aunt Lola 1982, p.
3). GSS members continued to police members well into the 1990s. Some members
wore T-shirts that stated their sexuality on campus or openly discussed their sexuality
with other members in public places. In these situations, some GSS members would
hush more visible members because they were “afraid to be seen on campus [or
elsewhere]” with someone who was too vocal because of “internalized homophobia” and
the fear of reprisal (Interview, Steve, March 29, 2010). GSS members used these
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policing tactics to protect GSS from unwanted attention. By encouraging specific, less
threatening forms of visibility GSS tried to normalize public perceptions of its members
to increase their safety (Currier 2010).
Visibility of GSS Support
Just as GSS members controlled their visibility carefully, so did GSS supporters.
The visibility of support for GSS depended on a variety of factors, but, for the most part,
mirrored GSS’s visibility. The primary exception to GSS support visibility mimicking
GSS visibility was when the support came from someone who could not publicly support
GSS because of the university's culture. Early in GSS's existence, some professors asked
GSS members to come to their classes and discuss lesbian and gay rights, equality, and
stereotypes. During these discussions, when appropriate, GSS members would also
address the religious arguments against homosexuality because of their local cultural
prevalence. Amy remembered that 
inevitably there would always be one kid, frequently a Corps guy, who would
come to the front of the room after the rest of the class had left…[He would
indicate] that he was very uncomfortable, not because he was gay—these would
be straight kids—[but]because his church and his parents would have taught him
on the one hand to not judge a book by its cover…and yet, at the same time, they
are teaching them to hate gay [people]…He would see that we weren't monsters
and he would be very conflicted about this and he would come and talk to us
(Interview, April 22, 2010).
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Amy stated the GSS members felt “like they were getting somewhere” with students
despite their quiet support, because of students’ growing openness and ability to think
critically about the discrimination of people with non-normative sexualities. Students
slowly became more open to learning about different sexualities rather than the hateful
rhetoric they were familiar with (Interview, April 22, 2010). 
During the mid-1980s, Adam, a past GSS president who had made himself one of
the most visible members of the group, remembered incidents on campus when he
would get stopped by people every once and a while, often members of the Corps
of Cadets, to express support. And that would just happen at random. I would be
going to class and all of a sudden a Corps of Cadet member would come up to
me and say, “Thank you for doing that [fighting for the GSS].” At times, it would
happen when I would be in some administrator’s office. They would close the
door and say, “By the way, I support what you guys are doing,” and then they
would open the door and now we are back to like they hadn't told me anything.
That's really what I experienced more than anything [else negative] (Interview,
April 15, 2010).
These kinds of experiences occurred with those who were least able to support GSS
publicly. The university administration and the Corps of Cadets were overtly hostile
toward lesbians and gays. Neither Corps members nor administrators could publicly
support GSS without risking retribution from their peers and supervisors. In fact, Allen
noted that “if Koldus [the administrator in charge of student affairs and the GSS
application] had done the right thing” by granting GSS official status, he probably would
have lost his job (Interview, March 18, 2010).
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Over time, as GSS became more visible on campus, so did their support. In 1976,
the Student Senate passed a resolution supporting the administration’s refusal to
recognize GSS. In contrast, in 1984, the Senate voted in support of GSS’s official
recognition as a student organization, even though most students opposed this action
(Fluegel 1984; Student Government 1984; Wahrmund 1976a). Despite the new found
support within the Student Senate, highly vocal GSS supporters faced scrutiny from the
university officials. In 1985, a Student Senate member who was “an outspoken supporter
of GSS” claimed to be the target of antigay discrimination, when the university
attempted to prevent him from graduating due to unpaid parking tickets (Snell 1985). He
sued the university, which forced TAMU to allow him to graduate (Snell 1985).
Additionally, the debate club held a debate on the subject of GSS recognition that Adam
attended as an advisor for the pro-GSS side. He recalled that the room the debate was in
was
split…into the pro GSS recognition side and the anti-GSS recognition side. All of
the audience members were invited to sit in the side of which they supported…
When I showed up, the anti-recognition side was packed with people, and there
was actually no room to sit…The walls were covered; there must have been
about 280 people on that side. On the pro-GSS side; there were like 25 people…
the final vote was 225 [against] to 75 [in favor]…We gained people on our side
constantly (Interview, April 15, 2010).
Despite this shift in support over the course of the debate, The Battalion completely
omitted this fact in a story about the debate. The article only stated the final numbers
which seem to be a large defeat for the GSS, while ignoring the large shift in public
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support for the unpopular group during the course of the debate (Interview Adam, April
15, 2010). The increasing willingness for the general public to openly support for GSS
signaled a subsidence in hostility towards GSS because of the growing acceptance of the
lesbian and gay community at TAMU.
General Effects of (In)visibility on GSS
After GSS won the lawsuit, GSS members knew that GSS had to be perceived as
the ideal student organization so that there would be no official reasons to deny their
application for recognition. GSS's initial application for recognition was denied on the
grounds that “the organization's goals and stated purposes 'are not consistent with the
philosophy and goals that have been developed for the creation and existence of' the
university” (Wahrmund 1976b). This occurred despite GSS's stated goal of “serving the
community…[GSS wanted] to operate as a referral service for professional counseling
for gays [and lesbians]…[and wanted] to provide information concerning gay life
through a speaker's bureau” (Turner 1976). The university took a vague stance on the
denial of GSS’s official recognition to prevent GSS members from fixing their
application (The Battalion Editorial Board 1984; Interview, Amy, April 22, 2010).
Because GSS members had no exact understanding of how they should or should not act
to remain within the university’s regulation for student groups, they were very careful.
The need to be perceived as the ideal student group turned GSS into a tightly knit
community. Lisa, a GSS member, recalled that their legal battle and being in the
spotlight “held the group together; it probably made it more cohesive” (Interview, April,
29, 2010). Adam also had a similar understanding, stating, “I think we were very careful
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about just having everything on the up and up so that there would be no excuse to deny
recognition on any other basis. So I think it [being visible] affected us in that way. It
made us a better group” (Interview, April 15, 2010). Furthering the goal of being the
ideal student group, GSS members carefully controlled the group’s public exposure and
avoided all political causes.11 GSS members separated the student group, GSS, from the
Alternative, the local community group that consisted of many of the same members and
also published the local lesbian and gay newspaper. When members instituted this
division, it existed primarily as a division on paper, not in reality. Both groups
maintained nearly identical membership lists because the local lesbian and gay
community was “was very small…everyone kind of knew each other”; the only
difference was that Alternative had non-student and student members while GSS could
only have student members (Allen, Interview, March 18, 2010). The division protected
members from undue scrutiny about their involvement with political causes, which
TAMU generally did not allow (Interview, Amy, April 15, 2010). GSS members
separated GSS’s finances and events from those of the Alternative so that there would be
no confusion over each group’s goals. GSS focused on service and education, while
Alternative focused on social gatherings and political goals.
Even after GSS received recognition, members avoided controversy as much as
possible. In 1987, shortly after receiving recognition, the group planned to show a
“sexual[ly] explicit” film on “safe sex between gay and bisexual men” (Anderson 1987).
Because they knew the film would cause controversy, although the film fulfilled the
group's goals of service and education, GSS members chose to show the film off campus
11 Members realized that the lawsuit itself was political, but they saw this as the university forcing their
hand. 
56
as a precautionary measure to prevent “unwanted attention,” according to one GSS
representative interviewed for The Battalion (Anderson 1987).  
GSS members were also careful about working with other student groups, even
those that had supported GSS during the lawsuit. GSS distanced itself from Students
Working Against Many Problems (SWAMP), a leftist organization. SWAMP had a
history of promoting free speech, including the GSS's right to free speech, on campus,
especially when it contrasted with popular views on campus (Roberts 1984). In 1984,
SWAMP planned a protest on the Memorial Student Center (MSC) lawn.12 According to
Thomas, who could not remember the exact reason for the protest, many students
believed SWAMP's protest at the MSC was a pro-GSS affair. The idea of people
protesting on the MSC lawn was so upsetting to the student body that “enough people
showed up to block their access. A human chain to block their access,” and the campus
police threatened to arrest anyone who participated in the protest (Interview, April 2,
2010). While the GSS had a good history of working with SWAMP, they distanced
themselves from this action because students and university officials viewed it so
negatively (Behlen 1984).
Conclusion
This case study shows how controlled visibility and invisibility enabled GSS to
navigate the sociopolitical environment at TAMU. Because GSS members and
supporters realized how important their (in)visibility was members allowed the group to
grow more publicly visible, while maintaining a certain level of invisibility to protect its
12 One of the most important traditions at TAMU is that no one walks on the grass at the Memorial
Student Center, which was built in honor of all TAMU former students who died in World War I and
World War II.
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members. As GSS became more visible, so did most of its supporters who were more
willing to display their support or help the organization. Thus, visibility allowed GSS to
recruit new members and encouraged mobilization of support of other groups and allies.
In contrast, invisibility allowed GSS to move more freely in a hostile context, while
minimizing public and administrative scrutiny through the creation of safe spaces. GSS
members knew that people were watching them, and this affected how they acted;
members knew they could lose their chances at recognition if one visible mistake was
made. 
Research on LGBT movements would benefit from further investigation into the
full spectrum of movement visibility and invisibility. By focusing on how visibility and
invisibility interact and are used by LGBT SMOs, scholars can further understand how
and when being visible or invisible is a positive or negative attribute for the SMO. As
shown in my study, these factors are dependent on sociopolitical variables, but the extent
of this relationship is not well understood. For example, the nature of hostility can affect
(in)visibility as seen with GSS's differing responses to free-floating and directed
hostility. How do LGBT SMOs try to control their visibility and invisibility? How does
public perception affect a social movement’s (in)visibility? What effect does this have
on a movement’s supporters and allies and on recruitment? 
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION – A REFLECTION
When I applied and was accepted into the Sociology graduate program at
TAMU, I knew exactly what I wanted to do. I planned to follow the path I had started in
high school and focus on the sociology of deviance. Soon after I began taking classes at
TAMU, my interest in deviance drifted, and I started to focus more on politics;
eventually I became interested in gender and sexual politics and social movements. This
led me to do my Master's thesis on the Gay Student Services lawsuit against Texas A&M
University. The entire process was frustrating, worrisome, and ultimately rewarding. 
Once I selected the topic for my thesis, I needed Institutional Review Board
(IRB) approval so I could begin interviewing GSS members and others knowledgeable
about the organization's actions during the 1970s and1980s. IRB approval itself
presented an issue. Initially, I submitted an expedited application, which was denied
because I planned to study a “sensitive subject.” After resubmitting my application with
minor changes three or four more times, and after as many months, I received IRB
approval one day before I left for a trip for an interview and to study a private archive.
While awaiting IRB approval, I primarily focused on archival work at TAMU's
Cushing Library. Archival research was a completely new experience, and I was not sure
what to expect. Prior to going to the library, I emailed an archivist who I was told would
pull the files I needed, all files relating to the GSS from its inception until the late 1980s.
When I got to the archive, there was a small folder containing less than ten pages, which
were copies of news articles all from the year 2000 or newer. My excitement quickly
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turned into despair: how was I supposed to document a movement organization based on
recent articles that only mention the GSS in passing? I knew Cushing had more data, but
I needed to find it. After asking around, I eventually found someone who was familiar
with what I was looking for. They brought me a cart containing three boxes of
documents on the GSS. After sifting through these boxes and discussing the archive's
materials with others, I heard rumors of more materials related to GSS. With more
digging and asking around, I found even more information. Interviewees granted me
access to their personal archives as well. The experience of unearthing documents in an
archive, especially when those documents have not been properly catalogued, was
interesting. Many documents archivists thought were lost or missing were found during
the course of my research. 
Interviewing GSS members and supporters proved to be the most memorable part
of this project. For the most part, the interviews went well. As expected there were
occasional difficulties, such as when I was unable to contact someone at the scheduled
time for a phone interview or when an interviewee got lost on the way to the interview
site. I worked hard to build rapport with interviewees. Interviewees and I would
exchange emails and on occasion phone calls before the interview date itself and we
would discuss GSS, TAMU and LGBT politics; we would also have these discussions
prior to the interview itself, in person. Interviewees also asked me questions about my
beliefs and about my interest in GSS. When asked about my interest in GSS, I explained
that one of my Master's thesis committee chairs mentioned the movement to me, so I
started to research GSS and its actions on campus to discover that it was a lost, but
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important, historical movement that I wanted to study further. Often, after I answered
this question, we would move on to the interview.
During the rapport-building process, some interviewees made assumptions that I
identified as gay, which I did not anticipate prior to starting my interviews., These
assumptions helped the rapport-building process. However, because I identify as a
heterosexual man, I felt like I was lying by omission when I did not correct
interviewees’ misconceptions about my sexual identity, but broaching the subject was
not always easy due to the flow of the conversation. When interviewees asked me about
my sexual identity, I always answered by saying I identified as a heterosexual man. I
worked to build rapport with interviewees that would result in candid, honest answers,
and I expected the same of myself in the interview's dynamic. Interviewees had differing
responses to my self-identification; some did not seem to care, others were surprised,
and a small minority seemed to feel betrayed. When the interviewees felt betrayed, there
was a two-pronged effect. First, the rapport I had cultivated with interviewees dissipated
because the interviewee no longer trusted me, so I had to work to reestablish a personal
connection with them. Second, a few interviewees questioned my reasons for choosing
to do a project on LGBT studies. In these cases, I did my best to explain my reasoning
for choosing to study the GSS’s mobilization and my personal commitment to ending
discriminatory practices based on sexuality, gender, race, ethnicity, class, or other
demographic characteristics. After this explanation, the interviewees seemed
comfortable continuing the interview.
These cases presented a problem because some lesbian and gay-identified
interviewees perceived me as an outsider (Merriam 2009). In some circumstances, I
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never disclosed my sexual identity to interviewees, which could make them feel that I
had betrayed them if they learn about my sexual identity in the future. This issue was on
my mind often, and I had to try to come to terms with whether I should disclose my
sexual identity to all interviewees and whether this disclosure would endanger my ability
to complete the interview and gather data. These experiences have affected my future
interests. I am still very interested in researching social movements, but am hesitant to
focus on another LGBT movement because of the ethical issues my sexual identity
poses.
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